Social Secret Sharing for Resource Management in Cloud by Narani, Sandeep. R.
Social Secret Sharing for Resource Management in Cloud 
(Technical Report Based on Ref. 5) 
Sandeep.R.Narani 
narani@siu.edu 
Department of Computer Sciences 
Southern Illinois University Carbondale, IL, USA 
 
 
 
Abstract: We first explain the notion of secret sharing and also threshold schemes, which can be implemented with 
the Shamir’s secret sharing. Subsequently, we review social secret sharing [6,10] and its trust function. In a secret 
sharing scheme, a secret is shared among a group of players who can later recover the secret. We review the 
construction of a social secret sharing scheme and its application for resource management in cloud, as explained 
in [5]. To clarify the social secret sharing scheme, we first review its trust function according to [9]. In this scheme, 
a secret is maintained by assigning a trust value to each player based on his behavior, i.e., availability. 
 
 
1. Secret Sharing 
 
Secret Sharing Schemes were discovered independently by Shamir and Blakely [3, 18]. The motivation for Secret 
Sharing is secure key management. In some situations, there is usually one secret key that provides access to many 
important files. If such a key is lost (e.g., the person who knows the key becomes unavailable, or the computer 
which stores the key is destroyed), then all the important files become inaccessible. The basic idea in Secret Sharing 
[3, 18] is to divide the secret key into pieces and distribute the pieces to different persons so that certain subsets of 
the persons can get together to recover the key. Secret Sharing refers to a method for distributing a secret among a 
group of people or participants, each of whom is allocated a share of the secret. This secret can be reconstructed 
only when a sufficient number of possibly different types of share are combined together. Individual single shares 
are of no use on their own in construction of the secret.  
 
 Example, suppose you and your friend suddenly got a map, that you believe would lead to an island, full of 
treasure of wealth. You and your friend are very happy and would like to go home and imagine for the exciting 
journey to the great fortune. Now, who is going to keep the map? If suppose  you and your friend do not really trust 
each other and are afraid that, if the other one has the map might just go alone and take everything. Now we need a 
scheme that could make sure that the map is share in a way so that no one would be left out in this trip. The best way 
to come out of the problem is to split the map into two pieces and make sure that both pieces are needed in order to 
find the island of the treasure. Now each of them has a piece of the map and is pretty sure that the other cannot reach 
the treasure without their help [1].  
Main Arena: 
• Secret: The document which is kept unknown for most of the members in the crew. 
And generally this document consists of any secure keywords or encrypted data. 
• Parties: The equipment required storing the key or the secret document, it might be computers or deposit box, or 
memory sticks, etc., the devices which are respectively used for storing purposes. 
• Share: The piece of the key allocated to respective personality. The combination of all the shares will lead to the 
final product. 
 These three areas remain the important aspects of the Secret Sharing. Losing or misplacing of any of these, 
may lead to disastrous results.  
 
1.1 Types of Secret Sharing 
There are many Secret Sharing deals with schemes, which were in use in early days for securing data 
transmission between two or more shareholders.  
One type of secret sharing scheme is one dealer and ‘n’ players which is the basic idea of Shamir's Secret 
Sharing Scheme [3]. The dealer gives a share of the secret to the players, but only when specific conditions are 
fulfilled, the players will be able to reconstruct the secret from their shares. The dealer accomplishes this by giving 
each player a share in such a way that any group of 't' for threshold values or more players can together reconstruct 
the secret but no group of fewer than ‘t’ players can. Such a system is called a (t, n)-threshold scheme (or (n, t)-
threshold scheme).  
The other type of secret sharing scheme is geometric in nature and is the idea of Blakley’s Secret Sharing 
Scheme [18] but it is not to the perfection as it deals with hyperplane. Nevertheless, this scheme can be modified to 
achieve perfect security. 
In this project, I am trying to review on the notion of Social Secret Sharing [10] and its trust functionality 
along with, how this construction can be used in cloud computing to create a self-organizing environment. In fact, 
distributed secure systems using threshold secret sharing can be adjusted automatically based on the resource 
availability of the cloud providers. It is also been illustrated how social secret sharing can be applied in the 
distributed systems using cloud computing technology which shares the files and allows for quick transfer of the 
shares. Paper contributions on the cryptographic primitive can be used to create self -organizing protocol in the 
cloud. It also states that distributed system can be reconfigured automatically based on the resource availability of 
the cloud providers by using social secret sharing scheme [5]. 
 
 2. Introduction to Secret Sharing Schemes 
 
In modern cryptography, the security of data is fully dependent on the security of the keys used. As most of the 
ciphers are public knowledge, one can easily encrypt and decrypt any message if they know the key involved. For 
some highly confidential data, it’s not always good to have a single person in control of the key and to secure of the 
data. This has lead to the need for Secret Sharing Schemes, which allow keys to be distributed among a group of 
people, with a pre-specified number of them needing to input their share in order, to access the key. Secret Sharing 
scheme is a cryptographic technique in the security area which allows confidential data to be split or shared among 
several storage providers. Individually, each provider will learn absolutely nothing about these data. Combined, a 
designated group of providers will be able to recover the data with the help of this scheme. Here are the 
mathematical techniques for constructing Secret Sharing Schemes followed by the applications of secret sharing 
schemes [8]. 
 
 
Fig 1. Secret Sharing [8] 
 
2.1 Secret Sharing Schemes Properties 
 
Basic Secret Sharing Schemes have two fundamental properties 
1. Secrecy: Unauthorized subsets of participants should be prevented from learning the secret. 
2. Correctness: Authorized subsets of participants should be able to recover the secret by pooling their shares. 
And most of the other properties of the Secret Sharing Schemes are extensively studied by  
• Mathematicians as objects of intrinsic interest in their own right. 
• Cryptographers as important cryptographic primitives. 
• Security engineers as techniques to employ in distributed security applications. 
 
 Consider a secret shared between friends in technical terminology, mostly Secret Sharing Schemes involves 
two hidden entities. 
• The dealer is the entity normally responsible for: 
- generating system parameters 
- generating the secret 
- creating initial shares 
- sending initial shares to participants 
 
• The combiner is the entity responsible for: 
- pooling shares 
-     reconstructing the secret 
 
3. Schemes 
 
3.1 Shamir’s Secret Sharing Scheme & implementation 
 
Old basic Secret Sharing technique is Shamir’s scheme which is based on polynomial interpolation & Lagrange 
interpolation formula given any k pairs (x1, y1), . . . ,(xk, yk) with  
xi= xj for all 1 ≤ i< j ≤ k, there is one and only one polynomial P(x) of degree k − 1 such that  
P(xi) = yi, for all 1 ≤ i≤ k [3]. 
 
• The secret ‘S’ is selected as the free coefficient in the random polynomial P of degree k −1 over the field of the 
positive integers modulo a large prime.  
• The shares I1, . . . , In are chosen as Ii= P(xi), for all 1 ≤ i≤ n, where x1, . . . , xn are pair wise and bitwise distinct 
public values. 
• Having the shares {Ii|i ∈A}, for some group A with |A| = k, the secret can be obtained using Lagrange interpolation 
formula as 
S = (𝐢∈𝐀 𝐈i   .𝒋  𝝐  𝑨  \{𝒊} 𝒙j𝒙j!𝒙j  )  
 
 
 3.2 Threshold Secret Sharing Schemes & Examples: 
In the first Secret Sharing Schemes only the number of the participants in the reconstruction phase was 
important for recovering the secret. Such schemes have been referred to as threshold secret sharing schemes. 
  Let n ≥ 2, 2 ≤ k ≤ n. The access structure A = {A ∈ P({1, 2, . . . , n}) | |A| ≥ k} will be referred to as the (k, 
n)-threshold access structure .We obtain Amin= {A ∈P({1, 2, . . . , n}) | |A| = k}, Á= {A ∈ P({1, 2, . . . , n}) | |A| ≤ k − 
1}, and Ámax= {A ∈ P({1, 2, . . . , n}) | |A| =k − 1}.  
In this an Á secret sharing scheme will be shown as (k, n) threshold secret sharing scheme. 
If P(x) = ak−1xk−1 + · · · + a1x1 + a0, the secret can also be have the shares Ii1, . . . , Iik by solving the system 
of equations 
ak−1xi1k−1+ · · · + a1xi11 +a0 = Ii1 
. 
. 
ak−1xikk−1+ · · · + a1xik1+ a0 = Iik 
 
  Where has k unknowns (ak−1, . . . , a1, a0) and it has a different solution because the determinant of 
as follow as  
 
 
xi1k−1· · · xi11     1 
xi2k−1· · · xi21    1 
... 
. . . 
xikk−1· · · xik1    1 
 
In the non-zero Vandermonde determinant. The point can be view, the polynomial P(x) can be chosen of 
degree at most k − 1. 
With having only k−1 shares, the system of equations, in Shamir’s equation. 
ak−1xi1k−1 + · · · + a1xi11=Ii1  -a0 
. 
. 
    ak−1xikk−1+ · · · + a1xik-11= Iik -1 -a0 
 
With k−1 equations and k−1 unknowns (ak−1,. ........., a1) has a different  solution, for any a0. Therefore, all possible 
values of the secret are equally likely. 
 
  The degree of the polynomial p(x) is known to be k-1 and it is remarkable or equivalent ak-1≠ 0 
then therefore scheme is not perfect. From the, any k − 1 users can determine an element b0 which is not the secret, 
i.e., b0≠a0, A polynomial Q(x) = bk−2xk−2 + · · · + b1x1 + b0can be determined using Lagrange interpolation formula, 
such that Q(xij ) = Iij = P(xij), for all  1 ≤ j ≤ k − 1, leading to the system [4]. 
 
   ak−1xi1k−1 + (ak−2− bk−2)xi1k−2 + ....................+ (a1− b1)xi11 + (a0− b0) = 0 
 
   ak−1xik-1k−1  + (ak−2− bk−2)xik-1k−2  + …………+ (a1− b1)xik-11  + (a0–b0) = 0 
 
 Let us consider the contradiction, that a0 = b0, from the above function with k −1 equations and k − 1 
unknowns (ak−1, . . ....., a1) has in this case a different solution, namely  
ak−1 = 0, ak−2 = bk−2, . . . , a1 = b1 that contradicts that ak−1≠ 0. Therefore, any k − 1 users can determine an element b0 
which is not the secret and eventually, their uncertainty about the secret does not tally with the uncertainty of an 
outsider. 
 
Shamir [3] has proposed choosing xi = i, for all 1 ≤ i≤ n. In this case, the secret can be reconstructed as for any group 
A with |A| = k [3]. 
S = (𝐈𝐢  .𝐢∈𝐀 .𝐣∈𝐀\{𝐢}     𝒋𝒋 − 𝒊) 
 
Example 1 
 
Let n = 5 and k = 3. Let us consider the polynomial P(x) = 2x2 + 7x + 10 over the field Z11. The secret is S = 10 and 
the corresponding shares are the corresponding shares are 
P(1) = 2(1)2 + 7(1) + 10   => 19 mod 11   =8 
P(2) = 2(2)2 + 7(2) + 10   =>32 mod 11   =10 
P(3) = 2(3)2 + 7(3) + 10    =>49 mod 11   =5 
P(4) = 2(4)2 + 7(4) + 10     =>70 mod 11 =4 
P(5) = 2(5)2 + 7(5) + 10    =>95 mod 11   =7  
Having the shares p (1), p (2), p (3) the secret can be reconstructed as  
= 8.   !!!! . !!!! + 10 !!!!  . !!!!  + 5 !!!!  . !!!!   
=> (-1) mod 11 = 10   
 
 
Example.2 
Shamir Secret Sharing with p = 31. Let the threshold be t = 3, and the secret be 7 ∈ Z/31Z. We choose 
elements at random a1 = 19 and a2 = 21 in Z/31Z, and set f(x) = 7 + 19x +21x2. As the trusted party, we can now 
generate as many shares as we like, 
(1, f(1)) = (1, 16)  (5, f(5)) = (5, 7) 
(2, f(2)) = (2, 5)  (6, f(6)) = (6, 9) 
(3, f(3)) = (3, 5)  (7, f(7)) = (7, 22) 
(4, f(4)) = (4, 16)  (8, f(8)) = (8, 15) 
Which are distributed to the holders of the share recipients, and the original polynomial f(x) is destroyed. 
The secret can be recovered from the first three shares (1, 16), (2, 5), (3, 5), we compute 
f(0) = !"  ·  !  ·  !(!  !  !)(!  !  !)+  !  ·  !  ·  !(!  !  !)(!  !  !)+ !  ·  !  ·  !(!  !  !)(!  !  !) 
=> 3 · 2−1 + 15 · (−1) + 10 · 2−1 = 17 − 15 + 5 = 7 
By using different calculation for the shares (1, 16), (5,7), and (7, 22), 
f(0) =   !"  ·  !  ·  !(!  !  !)(!  !  !)+  !  ·  !  ·  !(!  !  !)(!  !  !)  + !!.!.!(!  !  !)(!  !  !)    
=> 2 · 24−1 + 18 · (−8)−1 + 17 · 12−1 = 13 + 21 +4 = 7 
 
Shamir himself has remarked, his scheme has some interesting features: 
• In the Shamir’s scheme is ideal when the size of every share doesn’t exceed  the size of the secret . 
• It is active, in sense that if the threshold ‘k’ is kept fixed, some existing secret can be removed or some new 
secret can be generated, without affecting the other secrets. 
McEliece and Sarwate [2] have remarked that Shamir’s scheme is closely related to Reed-
Solomon codes and that decoding algorithms for such codes can be used for generalizing Shamir’s scheme. 
 
Some Difference among the Secret Sharing Schemes: 
• Verifiable Secret Sharing [7] 
• Chinese Remainder Scheme (schemes based on the Chinese Remainder Theorem) [19] 
• Secret Sharing Homomorphism (useful for many applications) [20] 
• Visual Secret Sharing (secret and shares are images) [21] 
• Black box Secret Sharing (schemes that are independent of the underlying group) [22] 
• Anonymous Secret Sharing (identities of participants not required for reconstruction) [23] 
• Ideal Secret Sharing (Shares equally to the size) [24] 
• Weight Secret Sharing [32] 
 
4. Adversary Model 
“A system without an adversary definition cannot possibly be insecure; it can only be astonishing”. 
“… Astonishment is a much underrated security vice.” (Principle of Least Astonishment) 
From the above stated statements, it can be explained that any system without an adversary, hardly can be believed. 
To have a highly secured system, we also need to plan about the adversaries the system may face in the future. The 
adversary model consists of set of assumptions, explicit and implicit, which have been made with regard to the 
adversary in any given situation. While there is precedence for using such a definition of adversary modeling, it is 
not widely used in literature and there are some changing properties in this model which are related to the traditional 
secret sharing model. 
 
• Trusted dealer: An adversary cannot corrupt the dealer, who is fully trusted. 
• Polarized participants: Participants are either completely honest which follows the protocol. 
or completely malicious and they have been captured by an adversary, who will attempt to subvert the protocol [17]. 
In all Secret Sharing Schemes, an adversary wishes to learn information about the secret, perhaps, through 
learning information about shares. However, with respect to the recoverability, the goals of different types of Secret 
Sharing Schemes vary. In the traditional model, the passive adversary can only engage in share capture and hence 
they can only try to prevent reconstruction of the secret through withholding shares. For each of the different types 
of Secret Sharing [3, 18], we shall begin, by identifying the main recoverability goals of an adversary. 
 
4.1 Types of adversary Model   
 
Passive versus Active Adversary: Every player has a curiosity to know the other players secret, but players feels 
they are honest to them. At the same time they have the curiosity to know the secret, which is an adversary. When 
players want to form the network or game, they will reconstruct an incorrect secret while trying to know the secret 
of others [5].  
Static versus Mobile Adversary: The former refers to an adversary who corrupts the players ahead of time whereas 
the latter refers to an adversary who corrupts the players while the protocol is executing [5]. 
Computational versus Unconditional Security: The network protocols are much secured and relies on basic 
presumptions (the hardness of factoring or discrete logarithm), from the adversary has unlimited computational 
power [5]. 
 
5. Verifiable Secret Sharing Schemes (VSS) 
 
What happens if in the middle of the procedure the players change their thinking, in terms of secrecy? Or change the 
content into a malicious data? Etc., 
To overcome the above problems VSS schemes [7] came into existences. In these schemes, shares are verifiable 
without revealing their secret and here we can also detect the malicious dealer causing changes to the content. In 
these schemes, every players can validate the compliance of the shares in both sharing and recovery phases. The 
authors [30, 31] provide the first unconditionally secure VSS when t < (n/3) with a zero probability of error. In this 
scenario, each pair of the players is connected in the network with a secure private channel. To receive a higher 
threshold t < (n/2), the existence of both private channels and broadcast channels is required. This protocol t < (n/4) 
has an insignificant probability of error. To verify the constructions, verifiable schemes based on symmetric 
bivariate polynomials are in an unconditional secured format [5].  
 
Properties of VSS: 
• Do not assume a trusted dealer. 
• Only authorize group of participants are given access to learn the secret. 
• Honest participants want to recover secret even if adversary corrupts the dealer and some shares. 
• Main recoverability goal of adversary is to prevent correct secret from being reconstructed. 
 
VSS scheme have an additional algorithm, which allows participants to check and perform the functions. 
Consistency: Upon, Verification the authorized group of participants, who accept their shares, will be able to 
reconstruct the same Secret. 
Correctness: If dealer was honest then value is the genuine secret. 
Types of VSS scheme 
1 Interactive VSS: If verification involves participants exchanging messages between themselves. [7]. 
2 Non-interactive VSS: If Verification involves only participants exchanging messages with the dealer.  
3 Publicly: Verifiable, if honest participants are assured of the validity of their own share and the shares of 
other participants. 
The notion of proactive secret sharing (PSS) [25] is proposed where the shares of the players are updated 
without changing the secret. This can be done by adding the shares of a new polynomial 'g' with zero constant term 
to the shares of the original secret sharing polynomial f with constant term ξ. As a result, the new secret sharing 
polynomial will be 𝑓 = f +g where 𝑓 (0) = ξ. In other words, players frequently change the secret sharing polynomial 
to deal with a mobile adversary who can incrementally collect the shares of the players while the protocol is 
executing. To assign multiple shares rather than a single share to some players, Weighted Secret Sharing (WSS) [32] 
is introduced which is used to prioritize different players in a hierarchy structure. 
It can be illustrate by using WSS how social secret sharing [10] can be applied in distributed secure systems by 
using cloud computing infrastructures. It can improve social secret sharing by proposing a new trust function. Here 
is a scenario in which the cryptographic primitive can be used to create a self-organizing protocol in the cloud. In 
fact, it has been shown that a distributed system can be reconfigured automatically based on the resource availability 
of the cloud providers. Subsequently a new trust function with social properties in order to improve the existing 
social secret sharing scheme is provided [5]. 
6. Social Secret Sharing 
 
In this scheme [6, 10], each participant or player will receive a constant number of shares during the start. 
As time goes on, these players are assigned to the weights based on their behaviors in the scheme. As results, which 
have the order to each player receives a number of shares corresponding to his trust value. The weights of each 
participant are adjusted in such a way that cooperative players receive more shares compared to non-cooperative 
ones. It alters; new participate to join the scheme while corrupted players are disconnected immediately. The 
construction of a trust function is independent of our proposed scheme. 
 Therefore, we use the trust management approach proposed in [9], they defined six possible actions (i.e., 
encourage, give a chance, reward, penalize, take a chance, and discourage).  These are the view held by the author 
views eventually, they apply monotonically increasing and decreasing functions in the case of cooperation and 
defection in order to compute players trust values. Now, the authors [10] can modify the major definitions required 
for our schemes. 
In this study, I made findings that are easy to comprehend and apply as well. The number of shares 
assigned to each person depends on that person’s level of work and the way he communicates with different people. 
It can be implied that the weight of this person is managed such that people who are participating along with him 
also get more shares when compared to that of the people who are not cooperating. Similarly, in our social life, we 
exchange or share our personal things and secrets only with the people whom we have trust on and vice versa.   
Definition 1: Social Secret Sharing is a three-tuple denoted as (Sha, Tun, Rec) consisting of Secret Sharing, social 
tuning, and secret recovery respectively. The only difference compared to threshold Secret Sharing is the second 
stage, in which the weight of each player Pi is adjusted according to his reputation [5]. 
A. Assumptions: 
We have made some assumptions on the properties which are necessary to build a Secret Sharing Scheme. Consider 
a secret ξ which is about to be shared: 
1) In order to retrieve this secret ξ, the total weight of selected persons Pi ∈ Δ must be equal or greater than the 
threshold: 
𝑤i   ≥   t𝐏i∈𝚫    
Here Δ denotes the set of uncorrupted members participating in the plan. It can be further shown that this 
set is then classified divided into three sub-groups N - new, B - bad and G - good that denote the people who are 
new, non-cooperating, and cooperating people respectively. 
2) Along with this the total weight of colluders Pi ∈ ∇ should not be more than the threshold, where ∇ denotes the set 
of corrupted players: 
𝑤i   <   𝑡𝑷𝒊∈𝜵    
3) Then the weight of each person Pi is limited by an attribute which is very much less than t, that is, wi ≤ m ≪t for 1 
≤ i ≤ n. 
B. Weight optimization: 
In this Social Secret Sharing Scheme [6], a selected person initially gets many numbers of shares from the 
sender. Eventually, the plan is modified based on the characteristics of the participants. The social tuning phase is 
further reviewed by following a set of steps. In order to make it simple, let’s consider making the weights increment 
or decrement in a step-by-step procedure. 
Adjustment: This is made on the basis of the available participants or the response time. Here the “reputation” and 
consequently the “weights” of all the players are adjusted. 
Enrollment: In order to incline the weight of a participant who cooperates, these groups combine to create a new 
share on the initial Secret Sharing scheme for the cooperating participating. This operation is performed in the 
absence of the sender. 
Disenrollment: Suppose the weight of an each player is decreased by one, then participants are combined to work 
together and upgrade all shares except in one share of the non-cooperative player. Therefore all shares are updated to 
be on a new secret function in a  polynomial f ̂(x), that share remains on the old Secret Sharing polynomial f(x), as a 
result, the share will not be valid. 
C. Trust Function: 
In the electronic commerce, major challenge is trust, “to believe a trusty” between a two or many different parties 
and how is their relationship between in global vision. “Trust” is a personal expectation an agent has about another’s 
future behavior and its individual quality calculated based on the two agents concerned in the present and future. 
“Reputation” is a perception, which an agent had on other intentions [9]. 
 The authors [9] had proposed, “A Trust party should increase their threshold α and keep cooperation 
increasing the reward to the maximum, when it decreases threshold β remains increasing the cost of defection. 
Reward and cost transaction fixed between α and β.” 
Definition 2: Let Tij (p) be the trust value assigned by Pj to Pi in period p. Let Ti: N → R be the trust function 
representing the reputation of Pi 
 𝐓𝐢(𝐩) = 𝟏𝒏 − 𝟏 𝑻ij  (𝒑)𝒋!𝒊  
Where −1 ≤ Ti(p) ≤ +1 and Ti(0) = 0. That is, we calculate the average of the trust values (personal quantity) in 
order to compute a player’s reputation [5] 
Let’s consider an example [5] to use the six possible keywords in  the trust values of P1, P2, P3 with respect 
to P4 be T 41 (p) = 0.4, T 42 (p) = 0.5, T 43(p) = 0.6 .consequently , reputation of  the trust value P4 will be T4(p) = 0.5. 
Public value Ti(p) is assigned to each player Pi that represents his reputation, i.e., Ti(p) = Tij (p) for all j. Therefore 
they are three types of players that is B: bad, N: new and G: good with these six possible outcomes [9] values are 
defines a below table where α and β determine boundaries on the trust values for a different set of players, they can 
be approach then applies functions µ(x) and µꞌ (x) accordingly to update reputation of each player Pi, Parameters η, 
θ, and κ are used to increment or decrement the trust values. In intervals [1−ε, +1] and [−1, ε−1], functions µ(x)and 
µꞌ (x)both converge to 0 due to our assumption .The trust function is not just a function  in the  single round but the 
history  it states that  more the better a participants for example where Ti(p) ∈ [α, 1−ε], and penalize more than  
worse a participant is, e.g., Figure 2 : Defection, where Ti(p) ∈ [ε− 1, β]. In addition, it provides opportunities for 
newcomers in the trust function but we do not know much about their behaviors and tragedies where Ti(p) ∈  [β, α]. 
 
Trust value Cooperation Defection 
Pi ∈ B if Ti(p) ∈ [−1, β) Encourage Penalize 
Pi ∈ N if Ti(p) ∈ [β, α] Give a chance Take a chance 
Pi ∈ G if Ti(p) ∈ (α, +1] Reward Discourage 
 
Table 1: Six Possible Action Functions in Trust [5]. 
 
                                         Cooperation       Defection 
  
Trust value 
Fig 2. Trust Adjustment by µ(x) and µꞌ (x) Functions [5]. 
 
Let li ∈ {0, 1} where li = 1 denotes that player Pi has cooperates with the current value and li = 0 denotes 
that he has defected. The proposed trust function [9] is as follows, 
Where x = Ti (p-1) ‘x’ is previous trust value. 
  
 
li = 1   Ti(p) = Ti(p-1) + µ(x); where 
 
θ – η/β + 1(x + 1) +η    Pi ∈  B 
        µ(x) = θ      pi∈  N 
  κ – θ/ 1 −∈  − α  (x − α) +θ   Pi ∈  G , Ti(p) ≤ 1- ∈  
  κ/ ∈(1 − x −∈) + κ     Ti(p) >1 − ∈  
 
li = 0    Ti(p) = Ti(p-1) - µ(x) 
 
  κ/∈(x+1) + κ      Ti(p) <1 − ∈  
  θ- k / β −∈  + 1  (x − €+ 1) + k   Pi ∈  B , Ti(p) ≤ 1- ∈  
     µ|(x) = θ      pi∈  N 
 η- θ /1- α(x - α) + θ    Pi ∈  G 
 
  
And for every function µ(x) and µꞌ (x)consists of four linear equations which are simply determined by two points 
(x1, y1) and (x2 ,y2) 
 
y = y2-y1/x2 -x1  
!!!!!!!  !!!     (x - x1) + y1 
 
          From fig 2 factors like “reward” and “penalize” are greater than “encouragement” and 
“discouragement” by assigning η = 0.01 < θ = 0.05 < κ = 0.09 defined at various points and trust function is 
calculated via regression .The authors [9] also determine parameters as the transaction cost to deal with cheap 
cooperation and expensive defections. For example consider a scenario in which every player co-operating a regular 
transaction for many times in order to get huge profits in the trust value. The authors can then defect in a critical 
transaction to severely damage the scheme. Therefore to adjust the trust value we need to define a   transaction cost 
parameter, a weight for cooperation or defection [5]. 
 
7. Introduction to Cloud Computing 
 
  John McCarthy has given the basic general idea of the technology in 1960s, and wrote 
“computation may someday be organized as a public utility.” In latter, grid computing concept is evaluated by the 
idea for making computer power as easy to access as an electric power grid. In 1990s cloud concept is introduced 
from telecommunications companies who made a radical shift from point to point data circuits to VPN (virtual 
private network) services. Prof Ramnath chellapa [11] defined the “Computing Paradigm where the boundaries of 
computing will be determined by economic rationale rather than technical limits alone”. This is the basic idea what 
we refer till today whenever we discuss about cloud computing concept. 
Cloud Computing [26, 27] is the use of computing resources of hardware and software that are delivered as 
a service over a network by typically the internet. The name comes from the use of a cloud shaped symbol as an 
abstraction for the complex infrastructure it contains in system diagrams. It also entrusts remote services with a 
user’s data software and computation. 
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Fig 3 Cloud Architecture [26, 27] 
Cloud computing relies on sharing of resources to acquire the coherence and economies of scale over a network as 
in the electricity grid computing and it is a wide concept to gather all infrastructure and shared services. 
 
7.1 Cloud computing in cryptography 
  
              Cloud computing is widely used in the IT business and many more workplaces, in that, cases file sharing , 
file transferring is done among different groups of people in the network, therefore these have a very highly 
confidently of security to do a secured task. For example, IDC’s 2008 cloud services user survey [12], executives 
had cited a number of different security challenges among the cloud users. Cloud Security Alliance’s [13] initial 
report contains all different sort of cytology based on 15 different security domains and processes that need to be 
followed in an overall cloud deployment. Security concerns are  
• Traditional security  
• Availability  
• Third-party Data Control  
At the same time there are also some security issues that can be encounter. Such as, we cannot depend on a 
single security in the cloud computing though traditional encryption can solve privacy-related problems that come 
into the new context. So that we will need to provide more secured functional cryptographic techniques. There are 
some cryptographic techniques that play a vital role in cloud computing security such as searchable encryption, 
proxy decryption, attribute-based encryption, Holomorphic encryption, and many others. 
Cloud	  
computing	  
  
8. Application in Cloud Computing 
 
From the NIST [28] the definition of cloud computing defines three service models. They are  
1. Cloud infrastructure as a service (IaaS): Infrastructure as a Service provides various infrastructures which contain 
hardware, storage and other computing resources. It provides to the consumer for processing, storage where, 
consumer is able to deploy and run selected software. They do not manage the hosted firewalls in the networking 
components. 
2. Cloud platform as a service (PaaS): Platform as a Service provides a ready to use platform these includes the all 
operation systems which consumers provides to the infrastructure and they also built applications on development 
frameworks and some functional databases. Consumer does not manage or control the underlying cloud 
infrastructure. 
3. Cloud software as a service (SaaS): Software as a Service provider provides an operating environment used to 
deliver a complete application in web- based applications. Apps related are email consumer does not manage or 
control any networks, servers, storage or OS. They can just use possible graphical user interfaces [14]. 
 
8.1 Types of file systems in cloud computing 
  
Google File System 
The Recovery on the distributed file system developed by Google and specially designed to provide useful 
and reliable access to data, using large server clusters. The GFS architecture consists of three elements: Clients, 
Masters and chunk servers. It consists of a single master and multiple chunk servers that are remote by multiple 
clients [15]. 
Amazon S3 
                    The Amazon Simple Storage Service is a distributed storage systems based on Dynamo [29]. The 
Dynamo uses key value storage in a Distributed Hash Table (DHT) and has no support association schemes. We can 
make a secure level of scalability and availability, data is divided and duplicated into multiple machines, using a 
consistent hashing, being consistency facilitated by multiple versions of objects [15]. 
Microsoft Azure 
Microsoft SQL Azure is compound of a set of services for data storing and processing data in cloud. The 
storage devices can access and balance of the load is done automatically through a set of nodes responsible for 
physical storage, providing scalability and availability. Consumer needs to create a storage account, which can be 
obtained from the Windows Azure portal web interface [15]. 
By using the “computing”, “storage” and “software” as a service the consumers are not required to invest in 
IT infrastructure on their own. A serious challenge in cloud computing is “resource management”. The consumers 
are expecting in terms of resource availability from the every transactions they perform. Platforms like vimeo, flickr, 
Slideshare, skype, etc., are listed as cloud applications; most of these platforms share the data (file transferring, 
image sharing, video, voice). However they are many more apps that might be less aware of it. They are some 
enterprises that provide money valuations in the cloud and satisfy their demands. The services are provided and try 
to maximize their own costs profits in situation of the data is prioritizing the consumers jobs. These factors may 
leads to competition, negotiation, dynamic allocation, and automatic load balancing [5]. 
 In the cloud the secure system using threshold Secret Sharing is done in the new method therefore, there 
exist some questions like how the systems can be automated that configures the availability of dissimilar 
components. Thus can be help to better comply with the service level agreements (SLA), it is a software serves as 
the foundation between cloud providers and consumers.  
 
There are some challenges in the cooperative game between the cloud providers and consumers, which are classified 
into: 
1) The set rules are followed by the service providers in service- level agreements. 
2) Consumers receive their services with a high satisfaction rate.  
 
Here is a scenario from cloud computing that influence the computer gaming industry. These gaming industries 
mostly are the online games and they do very huge business for cost profits the flexibility [16].Lets consider a ‘p’ is 
new creator in online multi-player games, wants to utilizes a computing cloud to deploy the core gaming for their 
previous game. Now ‘p’ doesn’t have any idea about the game whether public are going to accept it or not. 
Therefore ‘p’ has committed to choose a cloud computing platform for automatic scaling of a game. Eventually ‘p’ 
is ready to get a decent response time but the cost maximum for the threshold value at hourly in order to maintain 
their limited constraints. If response time is not met to the constraints likely ‘p’ loses some gamers, hence it will 
penalize the cloud provider in case of a violation. ‘r’ provides cost services and quality measurements services for 
the resource usage calculation of consumers. Now ‘p’ will handle the all financial cost calculations to ‘q’, it is hired 
by ‘p’ as trusted third party for resource usage. This typical scenario requires that ‘p’, with their cloud provider ‘r’, 
create a SLA 
• The Max hourly cost (Cmax) need to below the Thrmax 
• Average response time (RTavg) need to below Thrmax with respected to above  
• Max response time (RTmax) need to below Thrmax 
Thus ‘r’ is not capable of calculating the composite metrics in SLA .However it is capable of providing the 
running time and unit costs during negotiation process. Therefore ‘r’ is defined as the third party to look after the ‘p’ 
cost services. Cmax calculates the data from cost services and usage services. In case of SLA violations, management 
service is noticed and ‘q’ accounting is contacted for the financial penalties [15]. 
We can refer to excessive spike in online shopping with “Amazon” at the end of the year. It would be easier 
and flexible for the both consumers and service providers if the system takes can play the automatic configuration 
strategy and relies less on busier components during certain periods and limits in the configuration. Here comes a 
question, how this can be done by the continuous interactions between the providers and consumers. 
 In the distributed secure system using the threshold secret sharing even if the some servers do not act 
properly due to an adversarial attack or delay from the response time in the system, it can still perform the task if the 
certain number of components operates appropriately. Therefore, we intend to show this cooperation can be changed 
in the secret sharing scheme. In other words, the consumers use a reputation management from the system to rate 
different components in the systems. Further, the system is reconfigured over the cloud to have a guarantee the 
service-level agreement [5]. 
                   The author [5] consists of a dealer who initiates a weighed secret sharing scheme, n cloud 
providers denoted by P1, . . . ,Pn and many servers interacting with the cloud providers. Let r = (r1, r2, . . . ,rn) and w 
= (w1, w2, . . . , wn) be the vector of players’ trust values and the vector of players’ weights accordingly. The initial 
values in ‘r’ are going to be zero (i.e., all service providers are treated as newcomers), whereas the initial values in 
‘w’ are chosen by the dealer based on a specific distribution. We first define the following actions where each 
player’s action Ai ∈ {C, D, X}: 
1) C: for cooperative players where Pi is available at the required time and he sends correct shares to other parties. 
2) D: for uncooperative players where Pi is not available at the required time or he responds with delay. 
3) X: for corrupt players where Pi has been compromised by an adversary and he may send incorrect shares. 
Let assume a secret key ξ is selected in order to accomplish a secure task whenever it is required. For instance, we 
can refer to secure auctions in which bidders submit their sealed-bids to auctioneers when the auction starts and then 
the auctioneers define the outcomes (i.e., the winner and the selling price) without revealing the losing bids. 
We can therefore assume that secret key ξ is used by many auctioneers to start or accomplish several sealed-bid 
auctions overtime on behalf of a seller. Considering this secure auction scenario, a dealer (or a seller) first distributes 
shares of this secret among different service providers (or clouds) according to their initial weights in vector w₃, as 
shown in Figure 3. The author [5] then leaves the scheme. 
  W1=4       W2=2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        
 
                      DEALER 
      W4=1      W3=3 
 
 
 
Fig 3: System Initialization [5] 
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From the above system initialization, different servers or auctioneers interact with the cloud providers to perform 
their tasks in the absence of dealer from time to time. Requests for these shares are sent to the cloud providers by the 
server. The secret is recovered on these servers and then a secure procedure or sealed-bid auction is accomplished 
and finally the secret and its corresponding shares are erased from the servers and keep servers busy at the all-time 
check care of not go into idle state.  
 Trust – to- share ratio computation [9] this values may affects the weight of a players where actions Ai ∈ 
{C, D} as well as a trust function and these servers rate each component of the cloud in terms of its response time 
.The main issues is going to be more critical in real time systems where response time plays an important role.  In 
some case of corruption Ai =X values will be rebooted. Then values return to the scheme and are treated as 
newcomers as we illustrated earlier. Corrupted actions therefore sending incorrect shares are detectable by using a 
Verifiable Secret Sharing Scheme [7]. 
In the last phase, the service providers jointly collaborate to reconfigure the scheme from new weights and 
they initially enroll the new shares by using a protocol (enrollment) share of share S14 is enrolled for the fourth 
party. Subsequently, shares are updates except the shares that are scheduled to be disembroiled and they are 
transformed to a new Secret Sharing polynomial. If suppose same share S14 is not updated then the first player is 
going to have three shares afterward. The main benefit and reason for using the threshold Secret Sharing in a 
distributed secure system is its fault tolerance and availability. If one component is compromised by an adversary or 
he responds with delay, other participants can carry out the intended procedure [5]. 
 
9. Trust Function 
 
In Social Secret Sharing [10], some social characteristics and functions are in the new trusted function. Properties 
which are to be adjusted in order to adjust the trust values in different cases are [5] 
1. Type: α and β parameters are used to classify the players in three sets B, N, G. As a result, six scenarios are 
considered to increment or decrement the trust value. 
2. History: Ti(p) represents a history is action taken by a player Pi in the trusted function so far, therefore the 
quality of a  good player ranges from α all the way to +1 which characterize how good a players is and 
what kind of history the player has before the  trust function applies an single evaluation strategy. It is 
intended to use a social evaluation strategy by adding the following properties to our new trust function. 
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Fig 4: Self –Configuration [5] 
 
3. Sociality: Social behaviors of the some other parties each time in the trusted function and it is used from 
words beside player’s type and history this function. 
Consider all players together for trusted new function should be satisfying the following social conditions 
and those are [5]  
• If δ = n, i.e., all players have cooperated, it is not required to increase the trust value of anyone. 
• If δ = 0, i.e., all players have defected, it is not required to decrease the trust value of anyone. 
• If δ >n/2, i.e., majority of the players have cooperated, cooperation should be rewarded less and defection 
should be penalized more. 
• If δ <n/2, i.e., majority of the players have defected, defection should be penalized less and cooperation 
should be rewarded more. 
• If δ = n/2, i.e., the number of cooperative players and non-cooperative ones are equal, cooperation and 
defection should be rewarded and penalized with an equal ratio. 
Social trust function is termed from the trusted function using the previous µ(x) and µꞌ (x) function which is 
explained in earlier in the trusted function 
 
 Ti(p − 1) + (1 – δ/n )µ(x)  if  li=1 
                                       Ti(p) = 
Ti(p − 1)-( δ/n) µ′(x) if li=0 
An example from table 2, At each time players wants to gains at regular intervals of their rewards(25%) 
that is proportional to the number of “non cooperative” players, if player lose then trust value is (75%) that is 
proportional to the number of “cooperative” players in the social trust function [5].  
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δ= ∑ni=1 li Cooperation Defection 
N Ti(p − 1) No defection 
3/4n Ti (p − 1)+0.25 µ(x) Ti (p − 1)-0.75 µꞌ (x) 
1/2n Ti (p − 1)+0.5 µ(x) Ti (p − 1)-0.5 µꞌ (x) 
1/4n Ti (p − 1)+0.75 µ(x) Ti (p − 1)-0.25 µꞌ (x) 
0 No cooperation Ti (p − 1) 
 
Table 2: Computing Ti (P) with Different values of δ [5] 
Reputation is a social quantity which gives the all information about the player’s history. Thus it is valid 
assumptions that cooperation has more value if majority of the players and defecting, similarly human social life is 
which cooperation is appreciated more when most players are not cooperating. Further if all players are defecting 
the trust value should remain unchanged. Eventually competition eliminations justified by the uniformity of the 
actions [5]. 
 
10. Conclusion 
 
  The Social properties will produce a new model for system management in the distubuted secure schemes 
and shows Social Secret Sharing in cloud computing with a new trust function [5].Various tools in the IT 
infrastructure which need to have a security during their any kind of transaction in the cloud computing are shown 
their problems with existing models. I also conclude that all related topics regarding the Secret Sharing Schemes 
have implemented a Secret Sharing using numbers, threshold values and number of shares to disturb the secret 
among group. As a result, we came to know, secret can be constructed with the trusted mathematically and shared 
among in the new trusted function and can be used to access and maintain confidently in cloud computing. 
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